![]() The existing DOD guidance calls for a force of 50 attack submarines, although some Navy studies suggest that current operational requirements demonstrate a need for a force of at least 72 submarines. The results of the study were expected to be briefed to the Secretary of Defense in spring 1999. The Defense Intelligence Agency and the Navy – particularly the Submarine Warfare Division (N87) in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations – will also assist. ![]() The Joint Staff (J8) will lead the study, with participation by the Offices of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology (A&T), the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Program Appraisal and Evaluation (PA&E). In the context of the total DoD budget, affordability will be a major consideration. It will also build on previous force level analysis and the Defense Science Board’s recent study on the Submarine of the Future. In determining this future need, the study will assess the importance of stealth in littoral regions and whether submarines will be required to assume new roles because of the vulnerability of other platforms. Its goal is to determine the number of SSNs required for peacetime forward presence, national tasking, and warfighting in the 2015-2025 time frame. In March of 1998 the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered a new study of attack Submarine Force levels as a follow-up to the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). This force structure reflects continued deactivations of SSN-637 and older 688-class submarines, deliveries of the remaining two Seawolf-class (SSN-21) units through FY 2003, and subsequent deliveries of the New Attack Submarine (NSSN) class starting in FY 2004. Of special operations forces, and littoral ASW, while making a modest reduction in force size by the end of the FYDP.Īs directed by the QDR, the ongoing deactivation of older SSNs will decrease the force from 65 units in FY 1998 to 50 units in FY 2003. The QDR reinforced the ongoing shift in SSN missions from open-ocean antisubmarine warfare and surveillance toward power projection, support SSN missions include gathering surveillance data, communicating tactical information, controlling the surface and undersea battlespace, and delivering strike weapons or special operations forces ashore in contingencies. In the midst of significant changes in mission requirements spawned by advances in technology and the threat, the Navy’s attack submarine (SSN) force remains an important multimission component capable of conducting covert operations in forward TWENTY THOUSAND LEAGUES UNDER THE SEA, 1869 No tempest to brave, for when it dives below the water, it reaches absolute tranquility. No collision to fear, for it alone swims in deep water No cove to run short, for electricity is the only power No boilers to burst, no fire to fear, for the vessel is made of iron, not of wood No rigging to attend to, no sails for the wind to carry away No defects to be afraid of, for the double shell is as firm as iron, Submarine Warfare On the NAUTILUS men's hearts never fail them.
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